![]() Cooperate and give timely intelligence to United States' and allied intelligence services.Maintain operational security measures for the OSS and prevent infiltration of the OSS by enemy intelligence services.Analyze, process and exchange this intelligence.Collect information on espionage and subversive activities of the enemy.At its peak at the end of the War, the X-2 Branch had 650 personnel in its office. X-2 became the OSS liaison with the British, opened the doors of Ultra to OSS exploitation and operated throughout Europe and the world. The FBI and Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs further limited the OSS by restricting it from operating in the Western Hemisphere. The State Department and military services blocked the OSS from receiving communications intercepted from the Axis Powers, through the Ultra program, until the OSS created its own X-2 Counter Espionage Branch. With the beginning of World War II, the Office of the Coordinator of Information, headed by William Donovan, was split and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) created on 13 June 1942. By the end of World War II, the X-2 had discovered around 3,000 Axis agents. The X-2 established separate lines of communication for itself as a self-contained unit. With the creation of the X-2 Branch, the British insisted that it follow British security procedures to maintain the secrecy of Ultra. Donovan modeled the Counter Espionage Branch on British Counter Espionage. The X-2 was led by James Murphy, whose branch would have the power to veto operations of the Special Operations and Secret Intelligence Branches without explanation. A few months before, Donovan had established a Counterintelligence Division within the Secret Intelligence Branch of the OSS but rescinded this order upon development of the X-2. The cat-and-mouse game between FBI and KGB agents would continue, but “Operation Lemon-Aid” gave us insights that helped our operations for years to come.The head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), William Donovan, created the X-2 Counter Espionage Branch in 1943 to provide liaison with and assist the British in its exploitation of the Ultra program's intelligence during World War II. Both were convicted and ultimately exchanged for five Soviet dissidents. Enger and Chernyayev were the first Soviet officials to ever stand trial for espionage in the U.S. In the end, it was one of our most important counter-espionage cases of the decade. A third Soviet at the scene, Vladimir Zinyakin, had diplomatic immunity and was later expelled from the country. Soon after, we arrested two covert KGB officers-Valdik Enger and Rudolf Chernyayev. He grabbed the can, dropped off the canisters, and drove off. Lindberg approached the site, stopped the car, and picked up a can labeled “Ann Page Bartlett Pears,” as instructed by the Soviets. Hiding inside the trunk of Lindberg’s car were two FBI agents, with many other agents waiting at the drop site on a back road. We decided to set a trap-we gave Lindberg five canisters with actual classified materials so the Soviets would be caught red-handed. We moved in on when we felt we had enough information to make the arrests. Most of the pre-arranged “dead drop” sites where the secrets were supposed to be passed (it was actually declassified information) were along the busy New Jersey Turnpike. The Soviets repeatedly passed messages and money to Lindberg in the most ordinary, everyday items: magnetic key holders placed in phone booths, cigarette packs, soda cans, orange juice cartons, even a rubber hose from an appliance. Why? Because as we tracked the steady stream of phone calls and letters between Lindberg and the Soviets, we learned quite a bit about Soviet spy craft in the ‘70s. ![]() The letter was one of many communications sent by the Soviets to Lindberg, often in stilted English, after they took the bait in August 1977 until the following spring when we arrested two Soviet officials.Īt the outset, FBI Headquarters dubbed the spy case “Operation Lemon-Aid.” The name had no meaning, but as the case developed, it seemed to fit more and more. Lindberg’s modest income, impending retirement, and information access made him a perfect candidate to fool the Soviets into believing he would sell secrets for cash. Navy operations in New York and New Jersey. office as a front for espionage-specifically, to spy on U.S. At the time, we suspected the Soviets were using their U.N. “Ed” was actually Art Lindberg-a lieutenant commander in the Navy and a double agent recruited by the Naval Investigative Service and the FBI in the spring of 1977. To-day, as I have already noticed we have a lot of work to do: 1) Receive your material. “Please, read this letter very attentively. ![]()
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